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In times marked by trends as diverse as economic globalisation, international migration as well as fear of 
terrorism and organised crime, the efficient handling of borders has become an issue of political priority, 
in the EU and across the world. Modern, economy-oriented states have to rely on a flourishing trade and 
offer a comfortable degree of security to their citizens. The formula commonly chosen in combining 
these two objectives is that of ‘integrated border management’, which represents the delicate attempt to 
marry security concerns with trade facilitation. 
If the implementation of this innovative approach is already proving to be a challenge to well-established 
nation states, it becomes a genuine balancing act for an incomplete federation such as the EU, with its 
sensitive mix of a single external border and 25 separate legal/administrative systems. This working 
paper seeks to illustrate the difficulties encountered by the EU and develop solutions that should firmly 
go into the direction of a coherent, communitarian approach in border management, such as that 
sketched out by the recent Council Regulation No. 2007/2004 establishing the European Border Agency 
(FRONTEX). 
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INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT 
AT THE EU LEVEL 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 227/AUGUST 2005 
PETER HOBBING 
1.  External borders: The ‘skin’ of the Union 
External borders and their crucial role for the smooth working of the Single Market, the Area of 
Freedom, Justice and Security and other basic objectives of the Union have long been 
recognised. ‘Union’ and (common) ‘border’ have formed an inseparable pair of notions since 
the early days of the common market and the EEC customs union in the 1960s. Of course, one 
has always discussed the degree to which borders were operated well but their raison d’être as 
such was hardly ever challenged, almost as little as the importance of skin to the well-being of 
the human body. 
It took a little longer, however, before the act of handling such borders (jointly or not) had 
moved on as a separate issue into the spotlight of public attention. This occurred when people 
became aware of the daily realities of ‘Schengenland’, e.g. that ‘their own’ borders with the 
neighbours had disappeared, and that it was not ‘their’ police any more who were in charge of 
the new common borderline, far away from home. Discussions sprang up, inside the territory, as 
to whether ‘these foreigners on the border’ would do a good job in keeping the border tight, or 
create loopholes that allowed organised crime and illicit migration to penetrate all the way 
through the Union. Right on the border, discussions went in the opposite direction: ‘Why is it 
just us who bear all the responsibility and the financial burden?’ Weak links in the border chain, 
the need for burden-sharing and solidarity soon became the keywords and phrases of an EU-
wide debate.  
It was the merit of the Laeken European Council of December 2001 to have sensed these 
tensions and initiated a discussion on a new topic called ‘integrated border management’, which 
would take into account the interests of those both on the border and far away from it. Although 
the identification of the problem did not lead to immediate solutions, the debate was well 
received and it has stayed in the headlines ever since.  
It is therefore no surprise that The Hague Programme touches this popular subject; if there was 
anything surprising about the programme, it would be its assumption that there was something 
like ‘the integrated management system for external borders’ (European Council, 2004, item 
1.7.),
1 which existed as a pre-defined concept and has been just waiting for instalment. In 
reality, integrated border management
2 is a term with a rather short history and a wide spectrum 
of meanings – certainly not a good starting point for a precise programme (Box 1). There is not 
one ‘run-of-the-mill’ approach for all situations; solutions must be tailor-made in accordance 
within the economic and political context. 
                                                      
1 This is contrary to the EU Constitutional Treaty of December 2004 (OJ C 310 of 16.12.2004), whose 
Art. III-265 mentions the introduction of an integrated system. 
2 Hereafter referred to as ‘IBM’ for the sake of convenience. 2 | PETER HOBBING 
 
Box 1. Brief history of the term ‘integrated border management’ 
IBM, now definitively en vogue, seemed entirely unknown until the mid-1990s. Currently it provides 
the keyword for innumerable reform projects around the world and appears on government websites 
from Azerbaijan to Zambia.* The various contents being as heterogeneous as the regions involved, 
there is at least the common understanding that IBM relates to ‘lean government’ approaches and that 
border procedures should be governed by modern economic strategies rather than slow bureaucratic 
structures. The concept needed for the EU borders is naturally different from that appropriate for the 
North American NAFTA countries or even from that proposed by the EU for new neighbours in the 
east. 
* See for example Zambia (http://www.sars.gov.za/siyakha/about_transformation.htm). 
The purpose of this paper is to provide greater clarity with regard to determining 1) what one 
should understand by ‘the’ system of IBM tailor-made for the EU, and 2) to what extent The 
Hague programme appears helpful in implementing this objective. 
2.  A border concept appropriate to the EU 
A tour d’horizon of IBM concepts applied elsewhere shows to what extent these are adapted to 
the specific needs of their situation, before looking at the EU, whose specific territorial situation 
with a fragmented borderline and patchwork structure of legal systems requires a particularly 
complex solution. 
2.1  IBM concepts outside the EU 
In contrast with the EU, IBM elsewhere has mainly to do with greater efficiency in border-
related cooperation at the nation-state level.  
This is particularly true for the former communist countries in Eastern Europe with a tradition 
of hermetically tight borders that served for defence purposes, but had no major role to fulfil 
with regard to the movement of persons and goods. Within the same region, one also finds the 
opposite challenge of merely administrative demarcation lines between former Soviet or 
Yugoslavian republics, which now have to be upgraded to international borders. 
In other parts of the world such as the North American continent, IBM is mainly seen as a 
strategy to pool the resources of the various government branches in a border-related 
assignment, whereby this increasingly implies the involvement of private operators and citizens 
(the ‘border community’). Cross-border ventures between border agencies of two countries are 
also undertaken. 
2.1.1  EU enlargement and new neighbours 
For the newly independent states in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, there has been a direct link 
between border management and the setting-up of a market-oriented economy combined with 
democratic institution-building.  
During the first phase of PHARE and TACIS programme assistance, considerable attention was 
paid to the development of efficient border structures, mainly under the auspices of the customs 
and transport regulation.
3 The objective, then still traditionally phrased as “improving the 
                                                      
3 This was done by means of the Consortium Eurocustoms, created in 1991 by the 12 EU customs 
administrations (see Van Kuik, 2001 and European Commission, 1998). INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT AT THE EU LEVEL | 3 
 
                                                     
effectiveness of border controls”, soon switched to the more business and trade-oriented 
language of “effective border management” (1997) and finally “integrated border management 
strategy” (European Commission, 1999). 
IBM as it has emerged as a joint concept from the PHARE, TACIS and CARDS assistance 
programmes came to comprise the following basic elements: 
•  comprehensive tackling of the interrelated problems of trade, transport, insecurity, criminal 
smuggling and, where necessary, the development problems of the border regions 
themselves; 
•  strict requirements for the numerous authorities and agencies (especially border control and 
customs, but also transport, health, veterinary services etc.) to cooperate on common 
problems, rather than working separately and often at cross purposes; and 
•  strong encouragement for neighbouring countries to cooperate in managing shared borders 
(European Commission, 2002a). 
These basic principles further include the understanding that the various administrative branches 
upgrade their internal organisations by establishing smooth cooperation between their central 
and local levels, between border crossings and the green/blue border, and by setting-up an 
efficient equipment, communication and database infrastructure. Another feature is the 
professionalism of services provided: the countries concerned are strongly advised to release the 
military from any functions in border control, all the more where this is done with the 
involvement of poorly-trained conscript soldiers. Border controls should be ‘Schengen-
compatible’ in the sense that they conform to the Schengen Catalogue on external borders 
control (Council, 2002). 
This four-fold concept of IBM – in the sense of (i) a comprehensive approach to border 
problems across (ii) administrative and (iii) national dividing lines under the management of 
(iv) dedicated professional skills – today serves as an uncontested international standard. It is 
widely referred to by international organisations such as NATO (2003), the OSCE (2003), the 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF, 2004)
4 and in the Stability Pact 
(2003), and the not only in the Balkans but also for use in other regions (the Caucasus and 
Central Asia) (NATO, 2004). 
The EU CARDS formula, although a strikingly concise and reliable guideline in many respects, 
is missing one important feature for success, which is cooperation with the private sector, 
especially in the transport sector. Not only can due involvement of citizens and economic 
operators help to further streamline border-related procedures, insider tip-offs are also a 
valuable information source for the detection of illicit trafficking of all kinds (WCO, 1999). 
2.1.2 North  America 
North American borders face completely different problems, such as established demarcation 
lines for centuries and the fact that the US-Canadian (8,895 km) and US-Mexican (3,141 km) 
borders have particularly experienced a dramatic increase in cross-border movements of both 
persons and goods during the past 40 years. These factors result in a different approach (Box 2). 
 
4 It is in particular the Geneva-based DCAF that dedicates – as part of the security-sector reform in the 
Western Balkans – considerable resources to the restructuring of border services in the countries 
concerned. The ‘EU requirements’ are explicitly referred to as a benchmark for all these reforms. 4 | PETER HOBBING 
 
Box 2. Comparison of the NAFTA and EU approaches to borders 
Unlike the European Union, there has been no radical change in NAFTA clearance procedures: owing 
to its design as a (mere) free trade area, NAFTA could not altogether renounce internal border checks 
as does a customs and passport union such as the EU. Checks at the EU external borders are valid for 
the entire customs/passport territory as they are based on common rules for the crossing of the border 
(including joint lists of countries subject to a visa requirement or exempt from it)* as well as a 
common customs tariff (European Commission, 2005). Free trade areas grant preferential treatment to 
goods** originating in the territory of other partners but they maintain the general requirement of 
controlling all cross-border movements (i.e. to establish whether the goods in question originate in a 
member country of the free trade area (FTA)). Furthermore, FTAs as commodity and service-oriented 
ventures have had, from their very outset, no impact on immigration requirements. So far, NAFTA has 
no intentions of introducing any basic changes to this situation.*** 
*   See section 3.1.1 below. 
**  Art. 102 (1) NAFTA Agreement of 1992 (retrieved from http:// www.nafta-sec-alena.org/ 
DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?DetailID=80). 
***  General visa requirements for citizens from other NAFTA countries remain valid. As a special facilitation, 
there is now, in the US, a TN Visa for Canadian and Mexican Professionals, allowing the latter to engage in 
“business activities at a professional level” (see http://www.usimmigrationsupport.org/visa_tn.html). Also, 
technical border arrangements allow for the speedier clearance of “pre-cleared travellers”. A task force on 
“The Future of North America” recommends, however, creating a “common North American security 
perimeter by 2010 with combined visa, visitor screening, cargo inspection and political asylum policies” 
(see http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/1_1/security/25775-1.html). 
In view of this situation, the primary objective of North American IBM initiatives has been to 
reduce the “long waits to cross the border” without sacrificing the “correct balance between 
facilitation and control” (Waller Meyers & Papademetriou, 2000). Between Canada and the US, 
the issue is pursued by means of the Smart Border Action Plan of December 2001 identifying 
30 items of enhanced cooperation, notably through coordinated features of immigration and 
goods control (biometric standards, joint inspection systems, refugee/asylum processing, etc.) 
(ibid.). Integrated border and marine enforcement teams (IBETs) have been created to 
implement a harmonised approach to Canadian and US efforts in targeting cross-border criminal 
activity;
5 grassroots border communities consisting of business associations and citizens groups 
have become involved in contributing to the streamlining of border procedures in order to 
reduce the “long waits”. A similar ‘smart border’ partnership
6 is intended between the US and 
Mexico, however, with more emphasis on security than facilitation aspects. 
In terms of IBM, the North American approach is marked by a broad involvement of all border-
related government agencies as well as representatives of the civil society. This is combined, on 
the other side, with a rather traditional nation-state concept allowing for neither a general 
abolition of controls at borders with befriended nations nor the granting of any substantive 
cross-border powers to neighbouring enforcement services – thus representing an essential 
difference to the EU-Schengen situation. 
                                                      
5 IBETs include core agencies such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canada Customs and 
Revenue Agency, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the US Customs Service, the US Border Patrol 
and the US Coast Guard (the latter now being in the US Homeland Security Department). Each of the 
IBETs along the border may include other core agencies such as the Ontario Provincial Police. See 
Customs Canada, Fact sheet “Canada-United States Integrated Border Enforcement Teams” (retrieved 
from http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/newsroom /factsheets/2002/sep/teams-e.pdf). 
6 Action Plan announced by President George W. Bush in March 2002 (retrieved from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/usmxborder/22points.html). INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT AT THE EU LEVEL | 5 
 
Despite excellent contacts in terms of intelligence-sharing, the NAFTA countries grant each 
other no rights for cross-border enforcement action: between Canada and the US, agreement 
exists that, during the hot pursuit of criminals, services would inform each other through a pre-
established notification system, with the receiving side picking up the pursuit at the earliest 
possible opportunity. But as one US Homeland Security official puts it: “We never cross 
ourselves into Canada [for enforcement activities] and never ever into Mexico”. 
In terms of a future vision of border management, more hope seems to be based on 
technological devices rather than on trust between the neighbours: the smart border of the future 
will rely heavily on pre-arrival screening of passengers and goods as well as advanced 
technology to track the movement of cargo and the entry and exit of individuals. 
Whereas in many EU member states, the border control staff has been drastically cut down, 
sometimes close to zero(!),
7 there is a continuous upward trend in the US: after the sharp staff 
increases following the 9/11 events,
8 the Homeland Security Department continues to tackle 
border problems by recruiting large numbers of additional border inspectors. “In 2006, [the] 
Department of Homeland Security would have 8,500 more employees than it had in 2004. Many 
of those jobs would go for more Customs and Border Protection officers, Border Patrol agents 
and TSA screeners.” (See Barr, 2005). 
2.1.3  The customs approach 
EU customs – as a trade and economy-oriented administration – has always been two steps 
ahead of police and border guards in streamlining European borders and the procedures related 
to their crossing (Hobbing, 2003), with many of the measures being labelled as ‘service to the 
border-client’ (Box 3). 
Box 3. Development of a common EU customs administration 
The joint EU customs territory (‘customs land’) with a common external tariff was already completed 
by 1 July 1968, as opposed to Schengenland whose nucleus saw the light of day not before 1995. 
Customs administrations very early operated joint (juxtaposed) border installations (early 1960s), a 
Community-wide mechanism for fraud-combating (Naples Convention of 1967) and customer-oriented 
programmes stipulating a business-enhancement role of customs. Further, they concluded Memoranda 
of Understanding (MoU) with the transport community (since the 1980s) and engaged in joint 
vocational training of customs officials (Matthaeus programme of 1991).* 
* Council Decision of 20 June 1991, Official Journal L 187, 13.07.1991, p. 41
It is no surprise, that the term ‘IBM’, when used in a customs context, is primarily understood 
as a reference to trade facilitation projects, the most prominent of which are the WCO/UN-ECE 
Single Window Approach (a single-border declaration for all administrative purposes) (United 
                                                      
7 Owing to the Schengen Agreements, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
and Sweden have no external land border to control any more; France, Germany, Italy and others are to 
follow in 2007, leaving the control task to the eastern members Finland, Poland and Hungary. For details 
see Box 4 below. 
8 This was reflected in budget increases of $2.2 billion for border security, $619 million for customs 
(White House Border Security Fact Sheet www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020125.html). 
During the period 1993-2000 the size of the US Border Patrol had already more than doubled, see 
Andreas, P., “US-Mexico Border Control in a Changing Economic and Security Context”, US-Mexico 
Bulletin, 1 (January 2005). 6 | PETER HOBBING 
 
                                                     
Nations, 2003), the Time Release Study (comparative testing of the speed performance of 
customs and their efficiency in clearing goods) (WCO, 2002) and the WCO Data Model 
(management of cross-border trade by means of an interconnected electronic environment).
9 
Beyond this, there are other approaches – still business based – but in the clear perspective of 
rendering the fight against fraud more effective, in particular the trafficking of drugs and other 
illicit commodities: the WCO Action/Defis, recently renamed the WCO Business Partnership,
10 
incorporates a number of MoU initiatives formerly established to take advantage of field 
expertise in detecting irregular practices employed by competitors. 
Only after the 9/11 events did customs come to associate itself with the IBM concept 
predominating in the police world, i.e. to define it primarily as inter-agency cooperation at the 
national and/or international level  (WCO, 2004). At the EU level, there is specifically the 
attempt “to find solutions that can marry security concerns and trade facilitation” (European 
Commission, 2003). In its 2003 Communication on a simple and paperless environment for 
customs and trade, the Commission develops a concept that on the one hand provides traders 
with equal electronic access to border procedures throughout the Union and on the other allows 
it to perform, on the basis of the comprehensive trade data obtained, a large-scale analysis of 
specific crime risks. On top of this, a second Communication, transmitted to the Council and 
Parliament under the same cover, directly addresses “the role of customs in the integrated 
management of external borders” (ibid., p. 35), expressly underlining its complementary 
character in relation to the police/Schengen IBM Communication of the previous year:  
Both Communications are complementary and constitute the first stages in the overall 
strategy that the Commission is proposing for integrated and effective management of 
external borders, the aim being to achieve a coherent framework for joint action at EU 
level. 
In the security-related context of the 2003 Communication, customs IBM is based on the 
following features: 
•  uniform protection of the external border – member states must ensure that the principal 
security risks are addressed in a timely and harmonised manner at each point on the external 
(customs) border; 
•  border responsibility is to be shared by all agencies involved, with customs having the lead 
responsibility in “all matters relating to the control of legally and illegally traded goods”; 
•  the set-up of a multi-disciplinary authority responsible for safety at external borders – this is 
originally referred to the Common External Border Practitioners Unit and is now to be 
understood as a reference to the new European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders (EBA); 
•  the establishment of effective and rapid systems for information transmission between all 
the agencies involved, including reference to the PROSECUR procedure, proposed by the 
police/Schengen Communication (European Commission, 2002); and 
•  the possible set-up of rapid response teams to deal with unexpected risks, including creation 
of a ‘European reserve unit’. 
 
9 For further information, see www.wcoomd.org/ie/En/Topics_Issues/FacilitationCustomsProcedures/ 
DataModelBackground.html. 
10 This is a “business-led, customs-supported alliance created to combat narcotic smuggling via 
commercial trade” (WCO, 1999). INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT AT THE EU LEVEL | 7 
 
                                                     
Customs has thus established a seamless link with the Schengen border approach; but it should 
be recalled that this is just one of the two customs legs and that the distinct trade-facilitation 
approach remains equally valid. The second difference is that customs does not have to worry 
about the diversity in legal matters, which plays such an important role in the Schengen context. 
There is established European customs legislation in contrast to the 25 different legal orders 
existing for the administration of Schengen. 
2.2  The complex elements of an EU approach  
After the rather concise description of national IBM systems elsewhere in the world or within 
the closed circuit of customs administrations, one may be surprised as to how complex a system 
is necessary to run the complicated EU external border. 
Not that the EU land border is any greater than that, for example, of the US: on the contrary, the 
border is currently much shorter (7,169 km vs. 12,034 km). It will catch up with the US only 
after all the current candidates including Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey have been accepted into 
Schengenland.
11 Finally, the geographical profile is certainly not more demanding than that of 
the Western Balkan countries. 
Most of the complication is caused by the unfinished status of the EU as neither a nation state 
nor a full-size federation. The border thus resembles a scattered line surrounding a colourful 
patchwork of separate territories. The so-called ‘EU border’ is subdivided into a number of 
loosely connected national segments, each of them attended to by separate services. As a 
consequence, EU-specific IBM needs to take care – beyond the normal challenges – of the 
reconciliation between the many bits and pieces found on the chequered Union map. Unlike the 
US, there is nothing such as a coherent EU territory characterised by a single legal system and 
protected by a single border service performing its duty from coast to coast. 
2.2.1  A chequered legal landscape... 
At this stage, the EU consists of 25 separate legal systems, 13 of which are found (together with 
those of Norway and Iceland) within the territory of Schengenland. Border management is 
performed by 15 distinct national services, each exclusively responsible for one special section 
of it. But, following the gradual abolition of internal border controls, the respective shares of the 
border have become increasingly unbalanced (Box 4). 
EU border management is not confined to the simple checking of passports and the prevention 
of illicit movements across the green border. The requirements are more complex. As border 
staff are bound to carry out their assignments in taking account of the “interests of all parties” 
(Art. 6, Schengen, 1990), and in particular, refuse entry to foreigners “representing a threat to 
public policy, national security or international relations of any” Schengen member, they must 
possess a considerable knowledge of the political/legal situation in other countries as well as the 
appropriate language skills. 
 
 
11 A comparison of border areas based on border figures presented by the CIA World Factbook 2005 
reveals the following: US, 12,034 km; EU-Schengen (currently) 7,169 km; EU-Schengen (after inclusion 
of Turkey), 12,068 km; EU-Schengen, post-2007 (after inclusion of the 2004 newcomers) 9,080 km; EU-
Schengen post-2010 (after inclusion of Bulgaria, Romania) 10,306; (retrieved from 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html). 8 | PETER HOBBING 
 
Box 4. The balance of border management responsibilities 
In the beginning, things were rather balanced and just: each state would bear the burden of its border. 
With the opening of internal borders, more and more countries were relieved from control tasks on the 
land borders and the remaining ones bore an increasingly unequal share. In the early Schengen days of 
1995, the heavy weights France and Germany still managed about 98%, by 2003 their share had shrunk 
to 42% and with the gradual accession of the Eastern neighbours, it was further reduced to 20% (and 
with the likely accession of Switzerland this will decrease to 0!). Together with Norway, Finland and 
Greece, the main burden is shifting to the shoulders of the newcomers such as the Baltic countries, 
Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia, and later also to Bulgaria and Hungary (see Hobbing, 2003, 
p. 6). 
Border management implies considerable financial spending, especially if done on behalf of the 
entire Schengen group. For example, Poland assumes the need to recruit 4,000 additional border 
staff in order cope with the new challenge. There is furthermore the need to upgrade border-
crossing installations, surveillance equipment on the green border, linguistic and other special 
training for control staff, etc. Some assistance is provided by the so-called ‘Schengen facility’, a 
head-start funding programme providing the newcomers with approximately €963 million (€280 
million thereof for Poland) over the period 2004-06 to improve infrastructures at frontiers, staff 
training, etc.
12 But expenses are a continuing matter that require solutions beyond 2006: for this 
reason, it is a longstanding objective pursued by the Commission (European Commission, 2003, 
para. 46), that the external border has to be managed in explicit solidarity among the member 
states.  
Nevertheless, burden-sharing represents an extremely delicate issue given that solidarity is 
understood by the ‘old’ member states (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) as a two-
way concept, foreseeing financial burden-sharing in return for Union involvement in the 
operational management of the border, in particular in terms of the possible creation of a 
European border police.
13 As the German Minister of the Interior Otto Schily put it, the member 
states concerned should pay for their own border expenses, if they reject any operational 
involvement by the others (Kubosova, 2005). The Eastern members in turn vehemently oppose 
the operational involvement and all the more the “more radical ideas of pan-European border 
police forces”.
14 Definitely not a promising prospect for the new European Border Agency that 
took office just a few weeks ago! 
                                                      
12 Concerning the individual funding amounts for the Schengen facility, see the discussion in section 3.2.2 
below. 
13 The G5 Declaration of 12 May 2005 states, “5. The European Border Agency must above all be an 
operational tool that enables in particular the initiation of intensified joint operations at the EU’s external 
borders. Risk analysis must drive the Agency’s activities to provide a clear basis for the implementation 
and evaluation of the joint operations. We undertake to assign to the Agency on detached duty suitable 
personnel to support or assist its proper functioning. We are studying the idea of a ‘European Border 
Intervention Police Force’ which would allow deployment, in times of crisis, of specialized national pre-
identified resources in our countries so as to intervene on the European external border.” (Retrieved from 
http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2005/europe_shengen051205.asp). 
14 Slovak Interior Minister Vladimir Palko on 14 April 2005, EU Observer of 15 April 2005; see also the 
remarks by Polish Interior Minister Ryszard Kalish on 20 May 2005: “Poland is opposed to the creation 
of a European border police force”, AFP, 24 May 2005 (retrieved from http://www.eubusiness.com/ 
afp/050514142032.6dz759oc). INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT AT THE EU LEVEL | 9 
 
                                                     
2.2.2  …and the adverse effects of key decisions from the past 
In light of these difficulties, it is an entirely legitimate question to ask whether this complicated 
situation could not have been avoided right from the beginning, by ‘tidying up’ the European 
landscape and creating a single European legal system combined with a single public service. 
From a utilitarian point of view, such a scenario might have come in quite handy; it would, 
however, not have corresponded with the historic visions of the time. The founding fathers of 
the EU did not envisage European integration by the merging of legal systems – not even their 
harmonisation or approximation was part of the plan. European unification was intended to 
occur by economic factors, i.e. the pooling of coal and steel industries of the former enemies in 
order to prevent future wars.
15  
Justice and home affairs remained a stepchild of European integration for other reasons as well: 
public opinion would easily accept the transfer of sovereignty rights in the economic field, but 
not so in judicial and law enforcement matters, which are widely considered as areas close to 
the heart of a nation. Every state has insisted on keeping its own criminal law system while 
most citizens felt (and still feel) some unease towards the idea of being tried by a judge from 
other than their own nation. Also, there was no strong lobbying group that would have pushed 
for the abolition of law enforcement borders as business and trade had done since the 1950s 
regarding the free movement of goods and services. 
When the opening of internal borders became definitive in the 1980s with the granting of the 
‘four freedoms’, including the free movement of persons, police and criminal justice agencies – 
entirely surprised by the events – feverishly started to think about ‘compensatory measures’ that 
could confine the risk of criminals abusing open borders. Up to that moment, European police 
and judicial services had been operating far apart from each other, almost as distantly as with 
countries overseas; possible assistance requests were handled through complicated and highly 
inefficient diplomatic channels. 
Despite considerable progress made during the 1990s with justice and home affairs becoming 
the third pillar of the EU, prospects have remained limited, i.e. a genuine alignment of systems 
was never envisaged. The Tampere European Council of October 1999 clearly downsized all 
expectations: instead of any full harmonisation, which had proved futile even on certain 
secondary battlefields of economic legislation,
16 there could just be mutual recognition of 
diverging criminal justice systems (European Council, 1999). 
To a still lesser degree, few prospects would materialise for any sort of European public service 
at the operational level: even in traditional first pillar areas such as customs, it was never 
seriously considered to enforce Community legislation by means of a European customs guard. 
Besides practical considerations, there is the subsidiarity argument of Arts. 5 and 10 TEC, 
which leaves it in principle to the member states to ensure the implementation of Community 
policies (Pappas, 1992). 
 
15 See the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 (retrieved from www.historiasiglo20.org/europe/ 
anteceden2.htm). 
16 Even former Commission President and ‘father of the Single Market’, Jacques Delors had recognised 
that it was illusionary “to wish to harmonise all” and member states should rather find means to mutually 
recognise comparable national procedures. The Cardiff European Council of 15 and 16 June 1998 took up 
this concept proposing to extend it to the judicial field. See de Kerchove (2004). 10 | PETER HOBBING 
 
                                                     
3.  Integrated border management ‘EU-style’: Current tools and their 
deficiencies 
IBM rules cannot easily be located within just one framework; they are spread across a number 
of legal and administrative instruments. They represent a multi-layered compilation of 
provisions, with only the basic ones found in formal legal texts such as the Treaty on the 
European Community or the Schengen instruments of 1985-90, while much of the rest has been 
adopted through informal arrangements, e.g. the Common Manual on external borders adopted 
by the Schengen Executive Committee (Council of the European Union, 2002a) and the 
Catalogue of Best Practices drawn up by the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation.
17 Further 
elements that make the IBM mechanism work practically are found in bilateral/multilateral 
arrangements among individual member states or between them and third countries. 
This situation is rather characteristic of the unsecured terrain on which the European Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice had to be built. Owing to the reticence of the political level to 
endow justice and home affairs with formal legal tools, practitioners took refuge in ‘practical’ 
solutions in order to cope with the day-to-day real world problems they were faced with after 
the abolition of the internal borders. A good part of the scepticism of civil liberties groups 
(Peers, 2005) is founded on the democratic deficit of an important share of the Schengen acquis.  
Another dimension of the IBM mechanism should be noted: not all measures from the Schengen 
tool set are directly border-related – some of them concern the internal territory but are still 
crucial to enhancing border efficiency.
18 Both types were already contained in the original 
instruments of 1985-90 but have developed decisively since. 
3.1  The original set of Schengen instruments from 1985-90  
During the early Schengen phase of the 1990s, the specific border-related mechanisms had to be 
based on a very small number of instructions from the original instruments themselves (so-
called ‘common uniform principles’). 
Art. 6 of the 1990 Convention
19 is widely considered the centre piece of the Schengen system 
(Niemenkari, 2002 and Council, 2002). Border checks must be a) systematic (“All persons shall 
undergo at least one such check”); b) equivalent all along the border (“An equal degree of 
control shall be exercised at external borders”); and c) take account of the interests of all 
Schengen parties (“taking account of the interests of all Contracting Parties”). The further rules 
contained within may be seen as aimed at implementation of these basic principles. 
The Convention, still in its external borders chapter,
20 stipulates important details for the 
crossing of borders in terms of formal requirements (only at determined crossings and at fixed 
opening hours, Art. 3) and material ones (“not be considered to be a threat to public policy, 
national security or the international relations of any of the Contracting Parties”, Art. 5). 
Another cornerstone of the early IBM system is found in the visa chapter, with its uniform set of 
visa rules for short-term visits not exceeding three months (Art. 10). There are ancillary 
 
17 The text is expressly labelled as “explanatory and having no legally binding status”; see Catalogue of 
Best Practices on External Borders Control, Removal and Readmission: Recommendations and Best 
Practices of February 2002 (retrieved from http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/catalogue20EN.pdf). 
18 The Schengen catalogue even mentions “four tiers” of the border model: activities in third countries, 
international border cooperation, measures at external borders – border management (border checks and 
border surveillance) (ibid., part 1, Introduction). 
19 Hereafter this is abbreviated as ‘SCH90’ for the sake of convenience. 
20 See Chapter 2 of Title II. INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT AT THE EU LEVEL | 11 
 
                                                     
provisions with a border impact such as the liability of carriers (Art. 26), liability of those 
providing assistance to unlawful immigration (Art. 27) and – of a highly practical importance – 
the Schengen Information System (SIS), to which authorities responsible for border checks and 
issuing visas are expressly entitled to access (Art. 101). 
These relatively few provisions were insufficient, however, to thoroughly shape Schengen-wide 
border management in view of obtaining a “uniform and high level of external border control” 
(Council, 2004b). The other elements needed were created outside the narrow context of the 
conventions, e.g. the joint list of countries whose nationals were subject to visa requirements
21 
and the uniform format for visas
22 established as part of the Single Market legislation. 
The most pressing need occurred in the practical field, as national services – once the Schengen 
‘laboratory’ had started its operation with just seven member states participating on 26 March 
1995 – were incapable of implementing rules and practices in a uniform way (Callovi, 2004). 
Additional guidance was thus provided in a more informal way through the Common Manual 
(Council, 2002a) adopted as an ad hoc emergency measure, established and regularly adjusted 
by the Schengen Executive Committee. The manual was largely confidential and not made 
public before its declassification in 2002.
23 In its current version, it contains 239 pages of 
practical instructions and numerous specimens of travel documents and visas. 
Among the measures available inside the Schengen territory, the highest importance is generally 
attributed to those that allow member states’ enforcement services to act at or even across the 
internal border lines where routine controls have been abolished. This is seen as a compensatory 
measure in cases where the controls at the external border may prove insufficient to filter out 
instances of illegal immigration; in addition, they are considered as a defence against the 
infiltration of criminals originating in other parts of Schengenland. 
The most cited mechanism is the safeguard provision of Art. 2(2) SCH90, whereby member 
states may reintroduce controls at the internal borders “where public policy or national security 
so require[s]”, often considered an ‘emergency brake’ of a primarily psychological value 
allowing hesitant parties to accept the abolition of controls that would otherwise have been 
rejected (Callovi, 2004). On the other hand, Art. 2(2) is often seen as the main tool for 
repressive governments to undermine the principle of free movement in favour of a 
“predominance of the security rationale” (Apap & Carrera, 2003). 
It seems, however, that the practical importance of this provision is largely overestimated, as the 
temporary reintroduction of controls occurs rather rarely, while enforcement services have in 
the meantime established more refined and less cumbersome ways to counter illicit 
movements.
24 (See Box 5.) 
Another pillar of the compensatory framework consisted of the provisions on police cooperation 
(Art. 39, SCH90). This mechanism was considered very advanced at the time of its creation, 
notably by allowing cross-border enforcement operations (surveillance of presumed criminals 
(Art. 40) and hot pursuit (Art. 41)), direct communication between local services (Art. 46(2)) 
and exchange of liaison officers (Art. 47). It should be remembered that before Schengen, police 
 
21 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2317/95 of 25 September 1995 determining the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the member states, based 
on Art. 100c TEC, OJ L 234, 3.10.1995, p. 1. 
22 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1683/95 of 29 May 1995 laying down a uniform format for visas, OJ L 
164, 14.7.1995, p. 1. 
23 Council Decision 2002/535/EC, OJ L 123, 9.5.2002, p. 49. 
24 See section 3.2 below. 12 | PETER HOBBING 
 
as well as judicial cooperation in Europe would at the most cover the exchange of information 
(and similar basic forms of assistance) and be operated through diplomatic channels; its 
efficiency had accordingly been very low. Development showed, however, that even this 
‘advanced’ Schengen state of play was quickly outdated. 
Box 5. Application of the safeguard provision at internal borders  
According to official statistics cited by Statewatch,* Art. 2(2) border checks have taken place, during 
the 2001-02 period on 172 days, i.e. 1) they occurred approximately every 13
th day somewhere along 
the 13,736 km of internal borders and 2) the chances of encountering such checks on the internal 
border of a given member state would be just 1 in 82. In addition, one should recall that when 
reintroduced the checks often do not concern the entire national border line, but just sections of it. 
Moreover, routine checks have proven – even long before the opening of the borders – a rather 
ineffectual tool in the fight against crime. In the densely populated areas of central Europe, there were 
so many ways to circumvent official border crossings via the green border and rural roads (Trees, 
2000), that even among enforcement specialists the abolition of border controls was not considered a 
great loss for crime control.** This became particularly visible at the end of the 1970s, when 
prominent hostages taken by terrorist groups such as the German Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) were 
‘shipped’ across European borders several times in order to change hiding places as noted by Boock 
(2002). The author himself can confirm from his border guard experience on German borders with 
neighbouring countries in the 1980s (France, Switzerland, CSSR and East Germany) that only the 
highly militarised borders in the East (‘iron curtain’) provided relative impermeability. 
* Statewatch European Monitor (Vol. 3, No. 4, February 2003), as cited by Apap & Carrera (2003), p. 6. 
** This was the result of a series of meetings held at Interpol Paris/Lyon 1989-92 under the heading “The Planned 
Single Market and Crime Control in Europe”. 
3.2  From Amsterdam to Laeken 
During the first years of operation of the Schengen system, it had already become obvious that 
expectations were not met at the external border where the existing rules and resources turned 
out to be insufficient for ensuring coherent border management (European Commission, 2002, 
paras. 12-14). Nor were they met inside the territory where even the advanced police powers of 
the Schengen Convention considerably lagged behind the freedom of movement granted to 
citizens (including criminals) through the Single Market. Politicians and practitioners thought 
about remedies that were first of all found at the bilateral level and later on encouraged by the 
EU. 
A great step forward was made by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 – whose Art. 62 foresaw 
Community competence for the crossing of external borders, rules on visas, etc. – and the 
integration of the Schengen acquis into the EU legal framework on 1 May 1999. 
Yet in terms of IBM, progress was equally shared by the EU and member states working at the 
bilateral level, as regards both border-related and internal measures. 
3.2.1  Border-related measures (phase 2): The concept of burden-sharing 
The reasons for accelerating the move towards IBM at the EU level after the turn of the 
millennium were many: 1) the forthcoming enlargement as such exercised considerable pressure 
on the Union to ensure a high degree of border security, all the more so as the shifting of control 
responsibilities to inexperienced new members was considered an elevated risk, while public 
opinion seemed in any event alarmed by the increase of organised crime ‘imported’ from the 
east; 2) the September 2001 events increased the pressure to cope with terrorist risks in a INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT AT THE EU LEVEL | 13 
 
coordinated way; and 3) the permanent need to reconfirm the mutual trust among those member 
states that had already abolished internal border controls – with their possible return to those 
controls overhanging the Union like a Damocles sword. 
The Commission programme of May 2002 
The signal for concrete action was finally given by the Laeken European Council of December 
2001 stating that a “better management of the Union’s external borders will help in the fight 
against terrorism, illegal immigration networks and the traffic in human beings” (European 
Council, 2001, Conclusion No. 42). The Commission Communication towards integrated 
management of the external borders of the member states of the European Union, delivered 
upon the Council’s request in May 2002 (European Commission, 2002), focused on the 
following five categories of suggestions:  
•  Common corpus of legislation 
Given the continuing reticence of member states to tackle the sources of divergence in the 
law enforcement/criminal justice field, the Commission confined itself to proposing a very 
modest programme of ‘legislation’, i.e. 1) the recasting of the Common Manual on checks at 
the external border, known for its rather doubtful legal status; 2) the introduction, into the 
Common Manual, of certain ‘best practices’ from the Schengen catalogue; and, 3) the 
production of a practical handbook for use by border guards. 
More ambitious items concerned the “standards and procedures to be followed by Member 
States in carrying out checks” and the creation of a “genuine inspection function at the 
external border”, which have eventually led to the proposal for a “Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across borders” (or Community Border Code, see 
European Commission, 2004) currently pending in the European Parliament, and the 
invitation by The Hague Programme to submit “a proposal to supplement the existing 
Schengen evaluation mechanism with a supervisory mechanism, ensuring full involvement 
of Member States’ experts, and including unannounced inspections” (see European Council, 
2004, p. 14). 
•  Common mechanism for coordination and cooperation 
A so-called ‘External Borders Practitioners Common Unit’ (EBPCU) was intended to 
become the central steering body for the EU’s IBM, responsible for carrying out risk 
analysis, facilitating operational projects on the ground and devising a common strategy for 
coordinating national policies. The EBPCU functions were initially attributed to the (loosely 
organised) Council Working Group SCIFA+, but as a result of increasing doubts about the 
capacity of SCIFA+ to meet the challenges involved, the idea of a permanent structure in 
the form of an agency soon came up. This new approach eventually led to the creation of 
the European Border Agency FRONTEX (see section 4.1 below). 
Another root of the EBA lies in the ad-hoc centres created by the member states, each 
specialised in one type of border management field (Germany: land borders; Greece/Spain: 
maritime borders; Italy: airports; Finland: risk analysis; Austria: training; and the UK: 
control and surveillance technologies). 
Furthermore, the ‘security procedure’ PROSECUR was proposed to establish direct links 
among the authorities involved in order to allow for permanent data and information 
exchange, whereby the technical infrastructure was provided by existing networks/databases 
such as SIS. 14 | PETER HOBBING 
 
•  Common, integrated risk analysis 
This item would require in the first place the identification of common risk indicators. 
Constant monitoring of these indicators would then allow drawing conclusions for an EU-
wide border risk-analysis. 
•  Staff and inter-operational equipment 
Suggestions were made to harmonise member states’ border infrastructure, both in terms of 
staffing (e.g. common training modules and joint language courses) and equipment (e.g. 
develop joint policies for expensive high-tech equipment such as helicopters). This would 
gradually reduce quantitative and qualitative disparities likely to create security distortions. 
Long-term this strategy is expected to include the option of setting-up a college for 
European border guards. 
•  From financial burden-sharing to the European Corps of Border Guards 
The burden-sharing concept is based on the observations developed above, i.e. that the 
responsibility for managing the common border is very unequally distributed among the 
shoulders of just a few member states, which in addition tend to be among the least 
privileged in economic terms. 
Well aware of the delicacy of the (third-pillar related) terrain and national sensitivities, the 
proposal exploited the burden-sharing argument in a limited fashion. More specifically, it 
did not go beyond a partial compensation of national expenses nor did it invoke the 
responsibility side of the argument in favour of those member states that wanted to share not 
only expenses but also active responsibility for the actual management of the border. 
The temporary solidarity instruments subsequently put in place (the Schengen facility) 
amounted to a total of €960 million, which was foreseen to upgrade border equipment and 
training levels in seven new member states during the period 2004-06. A more progressive 
framework was expected for the period 2007-13, but with the recent set-back at the June 
2005 European Council budget negotiations, it is yet uncertain what resources will be 
available for the new border. Table 1 shows the amounts envisaged for each country. 
Table 1. Schengen facility budget (€ millions) 
Member  state  2004 2005 2006 
Estonia  22.9 22.9 22.9 
Latvia  23.7 23.7 23.7 
Lithuania  44.78 61.07 29.85 
Hungary  49.3 49.3 49.3 
Poland  93.34 93.33 93.33 
Slovenia  35.64 35.63 35.63 
Slovakia  15.94 15.93 15.93 
Source: European Commission, “Justice and home affairs issues both new and crucial to EU enlargement 
process” (retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/enlargement/wai/fsj_enlarge_ 
intro_en.htm). 
The European Corps of Border Guards (ECBG) was thought to perform the following tasks 
under the command of the Practitioners’ Unit (EBPCU): 
-  handle surveillance functions only at certain parts of the external border and possibly 
later checks at border-crossing points;  INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT AT THE EU LEVEL | 15 
 
                                                     
-  exercise the full prerogatives of public authority needed to perform these tasks; and 
-  respect the national authorities’ powers in matters not covered by Title IV (visas, 
asylum, immigration and other policies related to the free movement of persons) and 
Title X (customs cooperation) of the EC Treaty. 
The ECBG would be open at all hierarchical levels to qualified nationals of any EU member 
state. 
Despite its moderate ambitions, the project encountered strong objections from some of the 
member states concerned, i.e. those situated on the external border (e.g. Poland and 
Finland), while being supported notably by France and Germany.
25 It was therefore 
abandoned and in November 2003 replaced by the less operational proposal for a European 
Border Agency. 
3.2.2  Internal measures (phase 2): Joint centres and other alternatives to 
border checks 
Internal enforcement cooperation in the late 1990s was marked by the attempt to establish more 
efficient cross-border solutions, in particular to create alternatives to the old-fashioned and cost-
intensive reintroduction of checks in the sense of Art. 2(2) SCH90. 
Joint enforcement centres 
From the perspective of avoiding bureaucratic communication structures in cross-border 
cooperation and taking advantage of direct personal contacts, a number of joint centres have 
been set up that host representatives of various enforcement services from both sides of the 
border (Maguer, 2002). A forerunner was the French-German Police and Customs Cooperation 
Centre (PCCC) based in Kehl on the Rhine border, inaugurated in 1998 on the basis of the 
intergovernmental Mondorf Agreement of 9 October 1997, concluded in conformity with Art. 
46 SCH90.
26
Officers from police forces (Police Nationale, gendarmerie for the French and Landespolizei 
Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate, Bundesgrenzschutz for the German side) as well 
as French and German customs units work together under one roof, thus helping to address 
security deficits in the border regions caused by the fact that the law enforcement intervention 
has, in principle, to stop at the internal border. The PCCC’s role concerns information exchange 
and coordination but there is no operational remit. Another prominent example is the Police 
Euregion Maas-Rhine with a trilateral commissariat (Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands).
27
Owing to the positive results obtained by the Kehl centre, this has become a model for regional 
enforcement cooperation implemented at numerous other locations throughout the Schengen 
territory and beyond, sometimes in the form of trilateral and quadrilateral structures: besides 
more than a dozen PCCCs created so far, there are also a number of police-only bodies called 
 
 
25 It should be added that some member states conducted test runs of joint teams operating on the 
common external border, e.g. Germany in December 2002 in cooperation with Greece, Italy and the UK, 
whereby the foreign officials, vested with public authority on the basis of a special provision of the 
German border guard law (BGS-Gesetz), were able to carry out passport controls, and other activities. 
26 For details see Hobbing (2003), p. 19. 
27 See La coopération policière en Europe (retrieved from http://www.ibz-gimborn.de/Berichte/ 
2003/Rapport%20IPA%2003%2008%20Europe.pdf). 16 | PETER HOBBING 
 
                                                     
‘Joint Police Stations’ (JPS). The further extension of these joint structures has been expressly 
welcomed and encouraged at the EU level by the Commission Communication on police and 
customs cooperation of 18 May 2004.
28
Alternative checking methods 
A pragmatic alternative to border checks developed by French services relies on the routine 
stops of French motorway users at the toll stations – without any inconvenience to other users, 
customs and police staff may single out individual cars or trucks and conduct checks. 
Within a zone of 20 km from the borderline, such checks rely on Art. L611-9 of the Code on the 
Entry and Residence of Foreigners of 1 March 2005,
29 while in other parts of the territory these 
may be based on other national provisions in accordance with Art. 2(3) SCH90.
30
‘Security partnership’ – A new generation of bilateral agreements 
Given that EU or Schengen-wide solutions such as the Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance 
in Criminal Matters
31 are not likely to be put in place rapidly,
32 member states have taken 
bilateral action to overcome the vacuum.  
A series of bilateral agreements have been concluded by Germany with Switzerland (1999), 
Belgium, the Czech Republic (2000), Denmark (2001), Poland (2002), Austria (2003) and the 
Netherlands (2005) (see Schmidt-Vockenhausen, 2005), and there is also a new Benelux treaty 
on police cooperation that was concluded in 2004.
33
The new agreements go beyond the limits of classical assistance in some striking ways and are 
considered a sort of ‘quantum leap’ in international police matters: hot pursuit, observation and 
undercover investigation are no longer subject to limitations in time or space (in the past, cross-
border action – if allowed at all – was confined to a border zone and certain time limits); 
enforcement officials are entitled to arrest offenders on foreign territory when caught in the act 
and surveillance may also take place as a preventive measure; local police offices may in urgent 
cases file requests for mutual assistance directly with a foreign authority (previously there was a 
multi-step procedure involving central authorities); staff engaged in cross-border operations can 
in certain cases be vested with public authority of the foreign state when acting under the orders 
of that state; the agreements cover the transmission and verification of DNA profiles; and, 
enforcement staff may spontaneously undertake cross-border threat prevention steps in cases of 
 
28 European Commission (2004a), Communication, Enhancing police and customs cooperation in the 
European Union, COM(2004) 376 final, Brussels, 18.5.2004, p. 10 (retrieved from 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/com2004_0376en01.doc). 
29 Code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile (retrieved from http://www.association-
diem.org/code-entree-sejour.htm). 
30 Art. 2(3) states, “3. The abolition of checks on persons at internal borders shall not affect...the exercise 
of police powers throughout a Contracting Party’s territory by the competent authorities under that 
Party’s law, or the requirement to hold, carry and produce permits and documents provided for in that 
Party’s law.” 
31 Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance on Legal Matters, OJ C 197 of 12 July 2000. 
32 So far, only three member states have ratified the Convention: Spain, Portugal and Denmark.  
33 See the Treaty of 8 June 2004 (retrieved from www.benelux.be/fr/rgm/pdf/rgm_Politieverdrag2004_ 
fr.pdf); see also Zanders (2005). INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT AT THE EU LEVEL | 17 
 
                                                     
emergency. Furthermore, the agreements foresee various forms of cooperative activities such as 
joint patrols, surveillance and investigations) (see Schmidt-Vockenhausen, 2005).
34
Another move forward was made by seven ‘core’ members of Schengen (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain). They decided to launch a 
‘Schengen-3’ arrangement
35 signed on 27 May 2005, which would intensify cooperation by 
means of data exchange on potential terrorists and other criminals (so-called ‘risk persons’), 
armed flight attendants and major football events (for example, the FIFA World Championship 
in 2006). 
3.2.3  Measures at the international level and on technical infrastructure 
It is self-evident that a comprehensive IBM approach has to be seen in a wider context and 
cover aspects of international cooperation as well the technical infrastructure, as both are 
indispensable to ensure the smooth running of the system. Although this paper does not intend 
to enter deeply into the subject, the following references seem important. 
At the international level, action should concern activities in and arrangements with countries of 
origin and transit (Callovi, 2005), whereby the focus would first be on the issuing of visa and 
other consular issues as well as readmission/return matters (dialogue on migration and asylum). 
Second, there is the technical border cooperation with neighbouring countries (e.g. new 
neighbours in the east) as well as traditional trading and political partnerships (e.g. the US and 
Canada), the intention of which is to enhance security but also to create a smoother system of 
managing borders and anticipating problems. In this context, recent arrangements with the US 
on the advanced transfer of passenger name records and data (PNR; see Council, 2004)
36 and 
container security (CSI; see Council, 2004d) are notable, as they embody mechanisms that lead 
to a ‘virtual forward-shift’ of the borderline, giving border staff added time for control purposes. 
Similarly, the internal technical infrastructure in terms of data and communication systems 
represents a cornerstone of the EU’s IBM: without the SIS linking relevant authorities – 
regardless of their geographical location in central offices in the capitals, as border staff right on 
the front line or consular representations abroad – a coordinated operation of border matters 
would be unthinkable. Of course, through the rapidly changing European landscape and the 
increasing number of participating countries and services, existing technologies become 
outdated. It is the challenge of the years to come to adapt the infrastructure to the new 
situation.
37 The envisaged SIS II system will be able to accommodate links with all 25 member 
states together with new visual features to enrich the content of the databases (fingerprints, 
photos, etc).
38 SIS II will share its technical platform with the future Visa Information System 
 
34 A major instance of cooperation referred to is the 2003 G8 summit held in Evian, when a German 
police force of 1,000 officers equipped with armoured water-cannon vehicles assisted the Swiss 
authorities in maintaining public order. See “Engagement de policiers allemands pour le G8”, UDC, 
Berne (retrieved from http://www.svp.ch/?page_id=460&l=3). 
35 See Nachrichten Überblick (retrieved from http://pocket.nachrichten.at/politik/innenpolitik/360885). 
36 EU-US Agreement on Passenger Name Records (PNR) of 28 May 2004, OJ L 183, 20.5.04, p. 83 
(retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/intro/pnr_agreement0504.pdf). 
37 European Commission (2003b), Communication, Development of the Schengen Information System II 
and possible synergies with a future Visa Information System (VIS), COM(2003) 771 final, Brussels, 
11.12.2003. 
38 See European Commission (2005b), “Schengen: From SIS to SIS II”, MEMO/05/188, Brussels, 
01.06.2005 (retrieved from http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/). 18 | PETER HOBBING 
 
                                                     
(VIS, Council 2004a), whose purpose it is to render visa application procedures more 
transparent, facilitate consultations and avoid abuse in the form of ‘visa shopping’.
39
4.  Current initiatives in light of The Hague Programme 
In 2005, the central event in border management has – so far – been the establishment of the 
EBA,
40 based on Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004,
41 with a seat in Warsaw
42 and the 
Finnish Colonel Ilkka Laitinen appointed as executive director.
43 This event definitely outshines 
all the rest but it should not be forgotten that further developments such as the Community 
Border Code, currently being discussed by the Council and European Parliament, and the 
proposed regulation for local border traffic between the EU and third countries equally merit 
attention. 
4.1  European Border Agency (FRONTEX) 
In comparison to the original concept of a European Border Guard, the EBA may appear a more 
modest achievement, given that it foresees no direct operational assignments and would not 
match the ‘blue helmet’ border force image that the Belgian presidency had originally had in 
mind back in 2001. 
Yet the EBA represents not only a realistic implementation (resentments against any type of 
multinational force were too strong at the time) but also one that seems able to adapt to 
challenges arising in the future. There is a solid financial and organisational basis as a 
Community body (Arts. 15 and 29)
44 and a clear hierarchical structure integrating the former 
ad-hoc centres of the member states as “specialised branches” of the agency (Art. 16). Unlike 
intergovernmental agencies such as Europol, the EBA has its own staff (Art. 17), and thus does 
not have to rely on liaison officers detached from the member states and who are still mainly 
responsible to the latter. The current staff amounts to 26 officials, but will eventually be 
increased to 100.  
 
 
39 For further details, see “EU Visa Information System gets go-ahead”, IDBAC website (retrieved from 
http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/document/2186/330). The first step will be the processing of alphanumeric 
data and digital photographs of visa applicants, to be implemented by the end of 2006. Among other 
things, the VIS database will include personal identification information, the status of the visa, the issuing 
authority and a record of persons liable to pay board and lodging costs. The second step will consist of the 
addition of biometric data to the VIS and will start, if possible, by the end of 2007. This second step 
should be taken in coherence with the choice of biometric identifiers in the field of visas and taking into 
account the outcome of the on-going technical developments. Some individual member states will be 
allowed to store fingerprints and facial images earlier than other member states. 
40 The official denomination of the EBA is the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. 
41 Council Regulation No. 2007/2004, OJ L 349, 25.11.2004, p. 1 
42 Decision taken by JHA ministers on 14 April 2005, turning down the further candidatures by Hungary, 
Estonia, Slovenia and Malta (see the EU Observer of 15 April 2005). 
43 See “Finn to head EU borders agency”,  EU Observer, 26 May 2005 (retrieved from 
http://www.euobserver.com/?sid=22&aid=19163). 
44 Besides the Community subsidy, EBA revenues also include contributions from the associated 
countries Norway, Iceland and later Switzerland as well as “any voluntary contribution from the Member 
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The agency’s role is based on the following cornerstones in terms of assignments, i.e. to: 
•  assist member states in training matters (Art. 2(1)(b)); 
•  carry out risk analyses (Art. 2(1)(c)); 
•  follow-up on research relevant for border control and surveillance (Art. 2(1)(d)); and 
•  support member states in organising return operations. 
Although operational action remains the prerogative of the member states (see clause no. 4), the 
Agency appears to have sufficient means to put its own stamp onto this sector as well. The EBA 
is responsible not only to 1) coordinate operational cooperation among member states (Art. 2 
(1)(a)); 2) evaluate, approve (!) and coordinate proposals for joint operations and pilot projects 
made by member states, but also to 3) launch its own “initiatives” in this field (Art. 3 (1)). 
Further, member states shall report to the Agency on operational matters occurring outside the 
framework of the Agency (Art. 2 (2)). 
EU-wide coherence of operational border management can further be promoted through the 
EBA’s competence over: 
•  evaluating the results of joint operations (including the establishment of a “comparative 
analysis in view of enhancing the quality, coherence, and efficiency of future operations”, 
Art. 3 (3)); 
•  co-financing such operations (Art. 3 (4)); 
•  developing and applying a common integrated risk analysis (Art. 4); 
•  establishing a common core curriculum for border guards’ training (Art. 5); 
•  following the development of research related to control and surveillance equipment and 
disseminating results to member states (Art. 6); 
•  providing “organisational and operational assistance” to member states in cases of need and 
at their request, including the “deployment of its experts for support” (Art. 8); and 
•  facilitating operational cooperation with third countries (Art. 13). 
With this wide spectrum of operations-related tasks, the Agency will doubtlessly be able to 
decisively contribute to the shaping of a Union model of operational cooperation. Further 
incentives such as financial subsidies and the offer of practical help through EBA staff on the 
spot appear quite tempting and hard to resist in situations of need. One can thus assume that at 
mid-term, mutual trust between the EBA and national authorities will build up and requests for 
operational assistance will become more frequent. In the end, the difference between the EBA 
expert teams and rapid reaction forces in the sense of the 2002 Communication may be hardly 
visible. 
Also, doors seem to be open to any subsequent development. As the Agency is tasked to 
commission an independent external evaluation of its performance (Art. 33), such a study would 
include the item of the “need for and feasibility of setting-up a European Border Guard” as 
requested by the European Parliament.
45
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4.2  Proposal for a European border code
46  
In conformity with the announcement in its 2002 Communication,
47 the Commission undertook 
to “clarify, restructure, consolidate and develop rules on border controls on persons” developed 
within the Schengen intergovernmental framework and give it a “Community character”. It 
hereby tackles the main criticism expressed towards the rules of the Common Manual and other 
acts originally adopted by the Schengen Executive Committee, i.e. their doubtful legal status as 
well as the parallel existence of “many overlapping sources”.
48
Presented in May 2004, the proposal is the first to be treated according to the new legislative 
procedure for border measures in force since April 2005 following agreement on The Hague 
Programme,
49 i.e. qualified majority voting in the Council and co-decision within the 
Parliament. Major changes proposed by the Parliament include the treatment of asylum seekers, 
checks on family members of EU citizens, non-discrimination standards to be respected by 
border guards and new procedural rights for persons checked at the border. 
4.3  Proposal for a regime of local border traffic
50  
This proposal is to be seen in the context of the ‘fortress Europe’ discussions of recent years, in 
which the EU has been widely criticised for introducing a new ‘iron curtain’ between the new 
member states and neighbours in the east.
51 Although the proposal cannot do away with the 
basic visa requirements imposed by the Schengen mechanism, there are a number of ways to 
soften the rules. The facilitation measures proposed centre around a special ‘L’ visa for border 
residents (‘L’ being taken from ‘local’). 
The advantages granted to holders of an ‘L’ visa would be numerous:  
•  As a multiple-entry visa, it is issued for at least one year and for a maximum of five years, 
entitling the holder to stay in the border area of the issuing member state for seven 
consecutive days maximum and without exceeding, in any case, three months within any 
half-year period.  
•  The issuing member states may decide to reduce or waive the visa fees normally foreseen. 
•  Specific border crossing points open only to border residents may be set up or specific lanes 
reserved for border residents at ordinary border crossing points.  
The implementation would be by the member states concerned, i.e. by conclusion of a specific 
agreement with the neighbouring country (e.g. Poland with Ukraine). 
4.4  Statements in The Hague Programme on border management 
A first reaction by border professionals towards The Hague Programme may be that of 
disappointment, since there is no specific header foreseen for their topic.
52
 
46 See European Commission (2004). 
47 See para. 22 on short term measures, European Commission (2002). 
48 See Peers (2005). 
49 Decision by the European Council of 5 November 2004. 
50 European Commission (2005a). 
51 See for example “Poland’s EU border challenge”, Radio Netherlands, 1.5.2004. 
52 In addition, borders appear as just an annex to the section on the “Management of migration flows”, as 
if the subject concerned only those wishing to leave their country definitely to resettle elsewhere or it did 
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It is partially regretted that some border issues are spread over several sections, e.g. the use of 
EU know-how and funds to “build border-control capacity” is under item 1.6, while the 
“external dimension” and the “use of passenger data for border and aviation security” are under 
item 2.2 “strengthening security” (Callovi, 2005). But this appears to be a formal concern rather 
than a disparity and may be explained by the lesser importance of borders as a general category 
in comparison with security and external relations. 
In terms of content, The Hague Programme contains more than a dozen assignments dealing 
with aspects of border management, whereby their respective added value and creative 
importance for the further enhancement of IBM are quite diverse. Besides mere reminders of 
existing tasks/deadlines such as the “swift abolition of internal border controls” or the 
“evaluation of the EBA...before the end of 2007”, creative new accents have been placed on 
certain issues previously neglected (European Council, 2004). These are the following: 
•  Reinforced supervision of the level of control and surveillance to ensure that it is equivalent 
all along the external border – the Commission is to propose a supervisory mechanism, 
based on member states’ experts and including unannounced inspections (1.7.1). This would 
replace the current peer-review function of the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation 
(Sch-Eval) and represent a big step forward towards an autonomous pool of inspectors, who 
could directly file infringement procedures against non-complying member states. 
•  Although The Hague Programme duly refers to the traditional concept of operational IBM 
as a national prerogative,
53 various action items definitely pave the way towards an 
operational function of the EBA: 1) the set-up of teams of national experts who can provide 
rapid technical and operational assistance to member states requesting it (Commission 
proposal to be presented in 2005); 2) an explicit instruction that the forthcoming review of 
the EBA and its tasks “should include the feasibility of the creation of a European system of 
border guards”; 3) an “assessment of whether the Agency should concern itself with [still] 
other aspects of border management”; and, 4) establishment of a Community border 
management fund (to be accomplished in 2006). 
•  This massive focus on increased powers of the EBA together with the reference to “long or 
difficult stretches of external borders…where Member States are confronted with special 
 
 
by all means, to return to their country of origin. This mix-up is, by the way, not in line with the 
Constitutional Treaty as adopted in December 2004, which in Art. III-267 confines “migration 
management” to the issue of a common immigration policy. 
53  Section 1.7.1 of The Hague Programme (European Council, 2004) states that “The control and 
surveillance of external borders fall within the sphere of national border authorities. However, in order to 
support Member States with specific requirements for control and surveillance of long or difficult 
stretches of external borders, and where Member States are confronted with special and unforeseen 
circumstances due to exceptional migratory pressures on these borders, the European Council: 
•  invites the Council to establish teams of national experts that can provide rapid technical and 
operational assistance to Member States requesting it, following proper risk analysis by the Border 
Management Agency and acting within its framework, on the basis of a proposal by the Commission 
on the appropriate powers and funding for such teams, to be submitted in 2005; 
•  invites the Council and the Commission to establish a Community border management fund by the 
end of 2006 at the latest; 
•  invites the Commission to submit, as soon as the abolition of controls at internal borders has been 
completed, a proposal to supplement the existing Schengen evaluation mechanism with a supervisory 
mechanism, ensuring full involvement of Member States experts, and including unannounced 
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and unforeseen circumstances due to exceptional migratory pressures on these borders” can 
easily be interpreted as preparation for a new phase of European border management 
marked by a strong central element.  
•  It has therefore been suggested that The Hague Programme should have gone one step 
further to directly propose two full-fledged experiments with expert teams, one on land and 
one at sea or even an “EU Multinational Coast Guard Corps” (Callovi, 2004, p. 7). Not only 
would this represent the management of maritime borders (one of the ‘hotspots’ on the outer 
demarcation line), but it would also establish the presence of a multinational force carrying 
out controls mainly outside the ports, thus being less likely to evoke national resentments in 
the population. 
•  Section 1.7.2 “Biometrics and information systems” contains another integrative task, i.e. to 
examine how to maximise the effectiveness and interoperability of EU information systems 
(SIS II, VIS, EURODAC) by using compatible biometric identifiers to make immigration 
documents secure against forgery and abuse. The same applies to EU travel documents 
(passports). So far agreement has been reached to use two identifiers (facial image and 
fingerprint images) for immigration purposes as well as EU travel documents (the 
Commission and Parliament had foreseen the facial image plus optionally a second 
identifier, but were overruled by the Council (Council, 2004c)). 
•  Within section 1.7.3. “Visa policy”, The Hague Programme promotes the concept of 
“Common visa offices”, which again represents a proposal to streamline existing border 
procedures as it will reduce national diversities in the application of visa rules. The 
Commission is to present a proposal in 2005, which seems well-timed in view of the 
introduction of biometric identifiers from 2006 onwards.  
There is certainly no complete synergy between all the ongoing initiatives and The Hague 
Programme, an element particularly missing in the latter to enable it to lend support to 
important issues such as the European Border Code project, which is still far from being 
accomplished. Nevertheless, The Hague Programme sets a few new accents helping to promote 
the specific requirements of integrated border management at the EU level. Even if generally 
not considered the ‘ambitious milestone’ as advertised by the Dutch presidency, it represents a 
solid continuation of the Tampere road. For those whose interests exclusively focus on IBM, it 
may still deserve the label of a landmark, signalling that this issue had not been utterly spoiled 
by the Tampere Conclusions in 1999. 
5. Conclusion 
The process of perfecting border management is sometimes seen as an integral part of a 
repressive strategy to make borders less permeable and discourage the free movement of 
persons. It is certainly true that IBM helps to further some aspects of security through the EU-
wide introduction of advanced equipment and coordinated communication/database structures. 
Borders will be a greater obstacle to those who are not wanted inside the territory. But, on the 
other hand, technology-based and coherently structured controls will present no obstacle to licit 
travellers – they are likely to even speed up clearance procedures.
54  
 
54 In this context, one should not neglect the seemingly paradoxical observation made at old-style borders, 
e.g. on the border between Poland and Ukraine prior to the introduction of the EU visa requirement, that 
control procedures then took much longer than is the case at a normal Schengen border where visa checks 
take place. INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT AT THE EU LEVEL | 23 
 
The use of high-tech equipment and biometrics in border control still involves a number of legal 
problems (particularly with regard to privacy), which definitely need to be resolved. At the same 
time, the use of advanced technology certainly promises a decisive streamlining of bureaucratic 
procedures and a general reduction of waiting times, without neglecting the security concerns. 
It would therefore be the great advantage of a carefully balanced IBM approach to be able to 
accommodate the interests of almost all involved at the border: travellers, transporters, border 
staff and security services. Also for the security concerns of the member states further away 
from the border, such a mechanism could prove a sufficient safeguard to maintain the trust 
needed for the open borders of Schengenland. 
On the other side, when such safeguards are not visibly in place, one must fear that these 
member states – pushed by public opinion – may return to old ad-hoc measures in the style of 
Art. 2(2) SCH90. It is thus to be strongly hoped that IBM represents a convincing solution to all 
those involved in border matters, because any return to fragmented approaches will not only put 
external border security at risk but also the well-functioning of the internal area.  
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